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Abstract
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-
channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain
assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no
information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee
in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove
the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security
of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes – a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a
four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol – and determine their robustness against information leakage
from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-
QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently
isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of experimental
implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4] provides an information-theoretically secure
way to distribute secret keys between two distant parties (commonly known as Alice and Bob).
In practice, however, this is not the case. This is so because real devices do not typically
conform to the requirements imposed by the security proofs. Indeed, various types of quantum
hacking attacks have been proposed and experimentally demonstrated recently, which exploit
devices’ imperfections in practical QKD systems [4]. To tackle these implementation security
loopholes, many efforts have been made, among which device-independent (DI) QKD [5–7] and
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [8] are two prominent approaches. The security
of DI-QKD relies on the violation of a Bell inequality [9, 10] and no knowledge about the inner
working of the quantum apparatuses is needed given that the apparatuses are ‘honest’ [11], i.e.,
given that they follow the prescriptions of the protocol and not those of Eve. DI-QKD is, however,
difficult to implement experimentally with current technology, especially for long distances [12–
14]. On the other hand, thanks to its feasibility, MDI-QKD has attracted great attention and has
been widely experimentally demonstrated in recent years [15–22]. In terms of security, MDI-
QKD closes all side-channels in the detection unit, which significantly simplifies the path towards
achieving implementation security, as now one only needs to secure the source. In particular,
MDI-QKD typically requires that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. Particularly,
it requires that Alice’s and Bob’s transmitters do not leak any unwanted information out of their
security zones.
Inspired by the results introduced in [23–25], which study the information leakage problem in
standard decoy-state QKD systems, here we relax such an unrealistic requirement and perform
a finite-key security analysis of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. In particular, we focus on
information leakage from two main apparatuses within the transmitters, the intensity modulator
(IM), which is used to generate decoy states, and the phase modulator (PM), which is used to
encode the basis and bit information. For instance, such information leakage might be due to a
Trojan-horse attack (THA) [26] performed by Eve. In this framework, we evaluate the security
of two prominent MDI-QKD protocols: the symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD
scheme [27], and the efficient four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol introduced in [28],
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which has recently been implemented over a distance of 404 km [20]. As expected, our results
show that MDI-QKD is more sensitive to information leakage than standard decoy-state QKD.
Still, we show that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission
given that Alice’s and Bob’s sources are sufficiently isolated. Moreover, we find that when the
amount of information leakage is small enough, its effect has a slightly bigger impact on the four-
intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol than on the symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-
QKD protocol. However, when the amount of information leakage increases, the four-intensity
protocol becomes more robust against information leakage than the symmetric three-intensity
protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we summarize the assumptions that we make
in the security analysis. In this section, we also define the symmetric three-intensity decoy-state
MDI-QKD protocol. Then, in Sec. III we present the parameter estimation method to determine
the secret key rate of the protocol in the presence of information leakage from the IM and the PM.
The simulation results for different practical cases are shown in Sec. IV. In Sec. V, we evaluate
the security of the four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and simulate its secret key rate.
Finally, Sec. VI summarizes the main contributions of this paper. The detailed calculations to
estimate the relevant parameters that are needed to evaluate the lower bound on the secret key rate
are shown in Appendixes.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We begin by providing a brief summary of the assumptions that we make on the users’ devices
in the absence of information leakage:
1. Each of Alice and Bob generates perfect phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs)
of the form
ργ
j
=
∞∑
n=0
pjn|n〉〈n|, (1)
where pjn = (γ
j)
n
e−γ
j
/n! is the probability that Alice (Bob) sends an n-photon pulse given
that she (he) selects the intensity setting γj , and |n〉 denotes a Fock state with n photons.
2. The state of a pulse generated by Alice (Bob) is in a single mode and the joint state of all
the pulses generated by Alice (Bob) is in a tensor product. That is, we assume that the
pulses are not correlated with each other when there is no information leakage. We note
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that the scenario where the users generate multi-mode signals could be evaluated with the
techniques recently introduced in [29], while the case of correlated pulses could be analyzed
with the techniques developed in [30].
3. There are no intensity fluctuations, i.e., the intensity of the pulses generated by Alice and
Bob is precisely γj .
4. Alice and Bob can perfectly encode the bit and basis information, i.e., there are no state
preparation flaws. We remark that the case of state preparation flaws could be studied using
the methods presented in [29, 31]
5. Alice’s and Bob’s phase modulators modulate only the phase of the pulses, and their
intensity modulators modulate only the intensity of the pulses. That is, the information
is only encoded in the desired degrees of freedom of the signals.
With these assumptions in mind, next we describe the specific steps of the symmetric three-
intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol in detail. Here, we consider a sifting strategy which
protects the protocol against the sifting attack [32]. This is so because the total number of
pulses sent by Alice and Bob is fixed a priori and, moreover, the termination condition is basis
independent [33]. More specifically, the steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. State preparation: The first two steps of the protocol are repeated N times, where N is a
prefixed number. In each round, Alice and Bob select a basis χ ∈ {Z, X} with probabilities
pZ and pX = 1 − pZ, and select an intensity setting γjA and γjB with jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w},
with probability pjA and pjB , respectively. Afterwards, each of them encodes a random bit
in a phase-randomized WCP of the chosen intensity in the chosen basis and sends it to the
untrusted relay via the quantum channel.
2. Measurement: The untrusted relay is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement on the
states received from Alice and Bob and then record the measurement outcomes. However,
the relay can behave as Eve decides.
3. Announcement of the measurement outcome and random data post-selection: Once the N
rounds of steps 1 and 2 have finished, the relay announces in which rounds he obtained
successful measurements together with the corresponding measurement outcomes. For each
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successful measurement event, Alice selects a fictitious basis ZAc or XAc with probability
pZAc and pXAc = 1− pZAc , respectively, and then she announces her fictitious basis choices.
4. Sifting: If Alice’s choice is the XAc basis, Bob announces his state preparation basis choice
but Alice does not announce hers and then they discard the corresponding data. If Alice’s
choice is the ZAc basis, both Alice and Bob announce their state preparation basis choices as
well as their intensity settings. We denote by ZjAjB (XjAjB) the set of indexes that identify
the successful measurement events when Alice and Bob select the intensity settings γjA and
γjB , respectively, Alice chooses the fictitious basis ZAc , and both of them select the Z (X)
basis. If the sifting conditions |ZjAjB | ≥ N jAjBZ and |XjAjB | ≥ N jAjBX are satisfied for all
jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w}, where N jAjBZ and N jAjBX are prefixed threshold values, Alice and Bob
proceed to execute the next steps of the protocol. If the sifting conditions are not satisfied,
the protocol aborts.
5. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob estimate a lower bound, which we denote by
NLclick,00,ss|Z (N
L
click,11,ss|Z), on the number of successful measurement events in the sifted
key data set Zss, in which both of them sent vacuum (single-photon) pulses. Also they use
all the data in the sets ZkAkB and XjAjB , except that in the set Zss, to estimate an upper
bound on the single-photon phase error rate in the sifted key date set Zss, which we denote
by eUph.
6. Information reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob perform an error
correction step for a predetermined quantum bit error rate (QBER), which we denote by
EssZ . Then Alice computes a hash of the sifted key data in Z
ss by using a random universal2
hash function [34] and sends Bob the hash value together with the hash function. Bob uses
the hash function to compute a hash of his corrected sifted key data and checks if the hash
value coincides with that of Alice. If both hash values coincide, this error verification step
guarantees that they share identical keys after error correction except for an exponentially
small probability. If this step succeeds, then they perform a privacy amplification step by
applying a random universal2 hash function to distill the final secret key.
Note that the sifting condition in Step 4 of the above protocol is only for data processing,
and it is not related to the termination of the quantum communication steps, i.e., Steps 1 and 2,
which is basis independent. Therefore, as indicated above, the protocol is secure against the sifting
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attack [33].
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION METHOD FOR LEAKY SOURCES
In this section we present a method to estimate the relevant parameters that are required to
evaluate the secret key rate formula in the presence of information leakage. For concreteness, we
consider the security analysis introduced in [35], which provides a lower bound on the secret key
length, `, given by
` ≥ NLclick,00,ss|Z +NLclick,11,ss|Z
[
1−H (eUph)]− leakEC − log2 2ε2sec − ε − log2 2εcor , (2)
where H(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1− x)log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. The
parameter leakEC is the amount of syndrome information declared by Alice in the error correction
step of the protocol, given by leakEC = |Zss|fECH(EssZ ) for simplicity, where the parameter fEC
is the efficiency of the error correction code. The quantities εsec and εcor are the secrecy and
correctness parameters of the protocol, respectively, and ε ≤ 1 − εZ,00εZ,11εph,11 with εZ,00, εZ,11
and εph,11 being defined as the success probabilities when estimating the quantities NLclick,00,ss|Z,
NLclick,11,ss|Z and e
U
ph, respectively. In other words, ε denotes the failure probability that at least one
of the estimations of NLclick,00,ss|Z, N
L
click,11,ss|Z and e
U
ph is incorrect.
In the following we show how to estimate the quantities NLclick,00,ss|Z, N
L
click,11,ss|Z and e
U
ph in the
presence of information leakage. For concreteness, we shall assume that the information leakage
is due to a THA performed by an active Eve. In this THA against the MDI-QKD system, Eve
separately sends bright light into Alice’s and Bob’s devices and then measures the back-reflected
light. In so doing, she can obtain partial information about Alice’s and Bob’s internal settings for
each experimental trial. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of Eve’s THA. We remark, however, that our
method is general and can be applied to analyze passive information leakage scenarios as well.
Importantly, and similar to the analysis performed in [25], a THA against the IM affects the
estimation of the parameters NLclick,00,ss|Z, N
L
click,11,ss|Z and e
U
ph, while a THA against the PM only
influences the value of eUph. Below, we follow the structure introduced in [25] to present the
estimation method in different steps. First, we mathematically relate the expected numbers of
events associated with different intensity settings in the presence of information leakage. Second,
we use Azuma’s inequality [36] to relate these expected numbers of events to the corresponding
actual numbers of events taking into account some bounded deviation terms. These relations
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FIG. 1: Each of Alice and Bob uses a photon source to prepare phase-randomised WCPs. Decoy states are generated
by means of an intensity modulator (Decoy IM). The bit and basis information of the pulses are encoded with a state
encoding setup (Encoding PM). The relay is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement on the incoming pulse
pairs. In a THA, Eve actively sends bright light pulses (thick blue arrows) into Alice’s and Bob’s devices to trigger the
emission of side-channel signals. Then, Eve measures the back-reflected light (thin blue arrows) to extract information
about Alice’s and Bob’s internal settings. Note that since the relay is untrusted (i.e., it can be even Eve), in this figure
we consider that it is the relay who performs the THA.
impose some constraints on the relevant parameters needed to evaluate Eq. (2). Note that, to use
Azuma’s inequality, the number of trials must be fixed a priori, i.e., before the trials start [33].
Finally, we estimate these relevant parameters given the constraints provided by the mathematical
relations obtained in the previous step. This last step can be done by using, for instance, linear
programming techniques [37].
A. THA against the intensity modulator
Here, we analyze a THA targeted against the intensity modulator (IM), which is used to
generate decoy states. To simplify the analysis, we first consider an asymptotic scenario where
Alice and Bob send an infinite number of pulses.
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TABLE I: Quantum systems defined in a THA against the IM
EAp (E
B
p ) Eve’s probe system sent to Alice (Bob)
EAa (E
B
a ) Eve’s ancillary system which could be entangled with E
A
p (E
B
p )
EA
′
p (E
B′
p ) Back-reflected light from E
A
p (E
B
p )
ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm
Normalized joint state of Alice’s n-photon pulse and Bob’s m-photon pulse
when they select the intensity settings γjA and γjB , respectively, with the
same basis choice χ, and the systems EAa , E
B
a , E
A′
p , E
B′
p in the ith trial
1. The Asymptotic Limit
Let us denote the intensity settings of Alice and Bob in the ith trial of the protocol by γjA,i
and γjB,i with jA, jB ∈ {s, v, w}. Also, suppose that Eve prepares and sends Alice (Bob) a
probe system EAp (E
B
p ) which could be entangled with an ancilla system E
A
a (E
B
a ) stored in her
quantum memory. Here, for simplicity, we shall assume that the state of systems EAp and E
A
a
is not correlated with that of systems EBp and E
B
a . However, we remark that our formalism can
be adapted to the correlated case as well. Afterwards, Eve performs a joint measurement on the
pulses emitted by Alice (Bob) together with the system EAa (E
B
a ) and the back-reflected light
from EAp (E
B
p ), which is denoted by E
A′
p (E
B′
p ). Let ρ
γjAγjB ,i
χ,nm represent the normalized joint state
of Alice’s n-photon pulse and Bob’s m-photon pulse when they select the intensity settings γjA
and γjB , respectively, with the same basis choice χ, together with the systems EAa , E
B
a , E
A′
p and
EB
′
p in the ith trial. Now, it is important to determine how well Eve can distinguish the states
ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm for different intensity settings. In particular, we consider how well she can distinguish
the intensity settings γjA and γjB from, say, γkA and γkB or γlA and γlB in each trial, where
jA, jB, kA, kB, lA, lB ∈ {s, v,w} and jA 6= kA, lA and jB 6= kB, lB. All these quantum systems are
listed in Table. I.
According to the trace distance argument [24, 25, 38], we have that∑
ω∈Ω
∣∣∣P (ω|ργjAγjB ,iχ,nm )− P (ω|σγkAlAγkBlB ,iχ,nm )∣∣∣ ≤ DjAjB,kAkBlAlB,iχ,nm , (3)
where Ω is a set of physical events that satisfies
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω) = 1, P (ω |ρ) is the conditional
probability that the event ω occurs given a state ρ, and σγ
kAlAγkBlB ,i
χ,nm := qnmklρ
γkAγkB ,i
χ,nm +
(1− qnmkl) ργlAγlB ,iχ,nm , where qnmkl = pkApkBpkAn pkBm /(pkApkBpkAn pkBm + plAplBplAn plBm) is a
normalization factor. That is, σγ
kAlAγkBlB ,i
χ,nm corresponds to the normalized joint state of Alice’s
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n-photon pulse and Bob’s m-photon pulse when they select the intensity settings γkA and γkB or
γlA and γlB , respectively, with the same basis choice χ, together with the systems EAa , E
B
a , E
A′
p
and EB′p in the ith trial. We remark that more general cases with up to eight different combinations
of intensity settings (i.e., all combinations of intensity settings except γjA and γjB) could be
considered here. The parameter DjAjB,kAkBlAlB,iχ,nm denotes the trace distance between the states
ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm and σ
γkAlAγkBlB ,i
χ,nm and it is given by
DjAjB,kAkBlAlB,iχ,nm =
1
2
Tr
[√
(ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm − σγkAlAγkBlB ,iχ,nm )2
]
. (4)
Basically, Eq. (3) quantifies how well the states ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm and σ
γkAlAγkBlB ,i
χ,nm can be distinguished
from each other.
Specially, let Ω = {click, no click}, where “click” (“no click”) represents a successful
(unsuccessful) measurement event at the relay and let Pri (click |nm, jAjB, χ) denote the
conditional probability that the relay obtains a “click” given the state ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm . Then according to
Eq. (3) we have that
|Pri (click |nm, jAjB, χ)− [qnmklPri (click |nm, kAkB, χ) + (1− qnmkl) Pri (click |nm, lAlB, χ)]|
≤ DjAjB,kAkBlAlB,iχ,nm .
(5)
By multiplying both sides of Eq. (5) by pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m and taking the sum over i = {1, 2, ..., Nχ},
where Nχ denotes the number of events when both Alice and Bob choose the χ basis, we obtain∣∣∣∣∣ Nχ∑i=1 Pri (click, nm, jAjB |χ)− pjApjBpjAn pjBm×
Nχ∑
i=1
[
qnmkl
Pri(click,nm,kAkB|χ )
pkApkBp
k
A
n p
k
B
n
+ (1− qnmkl) Pri(click,nm,lAlB|χ )
plAplBp
l
A
n p
l
B
m
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ pjApjBpjAn pjBmNχDjAjB,kAkBlAlBχ,nm ,
(6)
where Pri (click, nm, jAjB |χ) is the conditional probability that Alice selects the intensity setting
γjA and sends an n-photon pulse, Bob selects the intensity setting γjB and sends an m-photon
pulse, and the relay obtains a successful measurement result given that they both select the χ
basis. In Eq. (6) we have used the definition DjAjB,kAkBlAlBχ,nm =
1
Nχ
Nχ∑
i=1
DjAjB,kAkBlAlB,iχ,nm .
The quantity
Nχ∑
i=1
Pri (click, nm, jAjB |χ) corresponds to the conditional expected number of
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events, which we shall denote by Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ. Then, we have that Eq. (6) can be rewritten as∣∣∣∣Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ − [qnmkl pjApjBpjAn pjBmpkApkBpkAn pkBm Eclick,nm,kAkB|χ + (1− qnmkl) pjApjBpjAn pjBmplAplBplAn plBm Eclick,nm,lAlB|χ
]∣∣∣∣
≤ pjApjBpjAn pjBmNχDjAjB,kAkBlAlBχ,nm .
(7)
If we take, for instance, the particular case where lA = kA and lB = kB, then Eq. (7) can be
written as:∣∣∣∣Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ − pjApjBpjAn pjBmpkApkBpkAn pkBm Eclick,nm,kAkB|χ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ pjApjBpjAn pjBmNχDjAjB,kAkBχ,nm , (8)
where
DjAjB,kAkBχ,nm =
1
Nχ
Nχ∑
i=1
DjAjB,kAkB,iχ,nm :=
1
Nχ
Nχ∑
i=1
Tr
[√(
ργ
jAγjB ,i
χ,nm − ργkAγkB ,iχ,nm
)2]
. (9)
Equivalently, Eq (8) can be written as:
Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ =
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pkApkBp
kA
n p
kB
m
Eclick,nm,kAkB|χ + ∆jAjBkAkBχ,nm , (10)
where the parameter ∆jAjBkAkBχ,nm ∈
[−pjApjBpjAn pjBmNχDjAjB,kAkBχ,nm , pjApjBpjAn pjBmNχDjAjB,kAkBχ,nm ].
Note that, by considering different values for the parameters {lA, kA, lB, kB}, one can obtain
similar equations to Eq. (10) that relate the expected numbers of events corresponding to different
intensity settings. These equations can be used as linear constraints to the estimation procedure.
Note that in the asymptotic limit where Nχ → ∞, we have that the actual number of events
converge to the expected number of events and therefore one can directly use the constraints given
by Eq. (10).
2. The Finite-Key Regime
In the previous section, we have derived mathematical relations between the expected numbers
of events associated with different intensity settings in the asymptotic limit. By applying Azuma’s
inequality [36], this analysis can be extended to the realistic regime where Alice and Bob send
a finite number (N ) of pulses. For this, one can consider a virtual scenario in which Alice and
Bob first decide the basis χ for each of the total N rounds. And thus the value of the quantity
Nχ is now fixed. To be precise, in such a fictitious scenario we perform a delayed choice of the
intensity setting “after” finishing all the basis choices in the actual protocol. Therefore, Nχ is
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fixed, and then we can use Azuma’s inequality for the decoy-state method. Note that the Kraus
operator acting on the ith pulse depends on all the previous intensity choices, all the basis choices
and Eve’s arbitrary operation that is dependent on all the announcements she made. Importantly,
the trace distance argument is still valid thanks to the generality of the trace distance as well as
the fact that Eve does not know Alice and Bob’s intensity information for the ith pulse in advance.
According to Azuma’s inequality, we have that
Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ ≡
Nχ∑
i=1
Pri(click, nm, jAjB |χ) = Nclick,nm,jAjB|χ + δjAjBχ,nm, (11)
where Nχ is the actual number of trials, and Nclick,nm,jAjB|χ is the actual number of such events.
The deviation term δjAjBχ,nm lies in the interval [−∆jAjBχ,nm, ∆̂jAjBχ,nm] except for a small error probability
εjAjBχ,nm + ε̂
jAjB
χ,nm where the bounds ∆
jAjB
χ,nm and ∆̂
jAjB
χ,nm are given by ∆
jAjB
χ,nm = f(Nχ, ε
jAjB
χ,nm) and
∆̂jAjBχ,nm = f(Nχ, ε̂
jAjB
χ,nm), respectively. The function f(x, y) is given by
f(x, y) =
√
2x ln(1/y). (12)
That is, εjAjBχ,nm quantifies the error probability that δ
jAjB
χ,nm is not lower bounded by−∆jAjBχ,nm and ε̂jAjBχ,nm
quantifies the error probability that the parameter δjAjBχ,nm is not upper bounded by ∆̂
jAjB
χ,nm. Note
that Azuma’s inequality takes any correlation between the probabilities Pri(click, nm, jAjB |χ)
associated with different trials into account. To simplify our notation, here we omit, however, the
explicit dependence of the probabilities Pri(click, nm, jAjB |χ) with all the previous events, all
the basis choices, and Eve’s arbitrary operation that is dependent on all the announcements she
made.
On the other hand, we also have that
Eclick,jAjB|χ ≡
Nχ∑
i=1
Pri(click, jAjB |χ) = Nclick,jAjB|χ + δjAjBχ , (13)
where Eclick,jAjB|χ denotes the expected number of events when Alice and Bob select the intensity
settings γjA and γjB , respectively, and the relay obtains a successful measurement result given
that both Alice and Bob select the χ basis in Nχ trials. Nclick,jAjB|χ is the corresponding actual
number. The deviation term δjAjBχ lies in the interval [−∆jAjBχ , ∆̂jAjBχ ] except for a small error
probability εjAjBχ + ε̂
jAjB
χ where the bounds ∆
jAjB
χ and ∆̂
jAjB
χ are given by ∆
jAjB
χ = f(Nχ, ε
jAjB
χ )
and ∆̂jAjBχ = f(Nχ, ε̂
jAjB
χ ), respectively. That is, ε
jAjB
χ quantifies the error probability that δ
jAjB
χ is
not lower bounded by −∆jAjBχ and ε̂jAjBχ quantifies the error probability that the parameter δjAjBχ is
not upper bounded by ∆̂jAjBχ .
11
By combining Eqs. (11) and (13), we obtain the following equation:
Eclick,jAjB|χ =
∞∑
n,m=0
Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Nclick,nm,jAjB|χ +
∞∑
n,m=0
δjAjBχ,nm
= Nclick,jAjB|χ + δ
jAjB
χ .
(14)
That is, we have that Nclick,jAjB|χ =
∞∑
n,m=0
Nclick,nm,jAjB|χ and δ
jAjB
χ =
∞∑
n,m=0
δjAjBχ,nm.
The equations above relate the expected number of events to the corresponding actual numbers.
These equations provide linear constraints on the quantities that we want to estimate. More
precisely, by combining Eqs (10) and (14) and by taking kA = kB = s, we obtain
Eclick,jAjB|χ =
∞∑
n,m=0
Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ
=
∞∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ + ∆jAjBssχ,nm
)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ
)
+ ∆jAjBssχ
=
∞∑
n,m=0
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
(
Nclick,nm,ss|χ + δssχ,nm
)
+ ∆jAjBssχ ,
(15)
where ∆jAjBssχ =
∞∑
n,m=0
∆jAjBssχ,nm .
Then, by combining Eq. (15) with Eq (13), we obtain the following linear constraints:
Nclick,jAjB|χ =
∞∑
n,m=0
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
(
Nclick,nm,ss|χ + δssχ,nm
)
+ ∆jAjBssχ − δjAjBχ . (16)
Thus, Eq. (16) relates the actual observed quantities Nclick,jAjB|χ to the quantities to be estimated,
Nclick,nm,ss|χ.
The equations above contain an infinite number of unknown variables. To numerically estimate
the quantities NLclick,00,ss|Z, N
L
click,11,ss|Z and e
U
ph by using linear programming techniques, we need
to reduce the number of unknowns to a finite set. Due to the fact that 0 ≤ Eclick,nm,jAjB|χ ≤
NχpjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m for all n, m and jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w}, we have that
∞∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ
)
≥
Scut∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ
)
,
∞∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ
)
≤
Scut∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ
)
+
∞∑
n,m=Scut+1
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Nχpspsp
s
np
s
m
)
=
Scut∑
n,m=0
(
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ
)
+NχpjApjBT
jAjB
Scut
,
(17)
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where T jAjBScut =
∞∑
n,m=Scut+1
pjAn p
jB
m =1−
Scut∑
n,m=0
pjAn p
jB
m for any natural number Scut ≥ 0.
Therefore, we obtain the following constraints:
Eclick,ss|χ ≥
Scut∑
n,m=0
Eclick,nm,ss|χ,
Eclick,ss|χ ≤
Scut∑
n,m=0
Eclick,nm,ss|χ +NχpspsT ssScut ,
Eclick,jAjB|χ ≥
Scut∑
n,m=0
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ + ∆jAjBssχ ,
Eclick,jAjB|χ ≤
Scut∑
n,m=0
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
Eclick,nm,ss|χ +NχpjApjBT jAjBScut + ∆jAjBssχ ,
(18)
for any jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w} and jAjB 6= ss. Importantly, these equations now have a finite number
of unknown variables.
Finally, according to Eqs. (11) and (13) we can replace the expected values in Eq. (18) with the
corresponding actual numbers plus their deviation terms. In so doing, for example, we find that
the parameter NLclick,00,ss|Z can be estimated by using the following linear program:
min Nclick,00,ss|Z
s.t. Nclick,ss|Z ≥
Scut∑
n,m=0
(
Nclick,nm,ss|Z + δssZ,nm
)− δssZ ,
Nclick,ss|Z ≤
Scut∑
n,m=0
(
Nclick,nm,ss|Z + δssZ,nm
)− δssZ +NZpspsTssScut ,
Nclick,jAjB|Z ≥
Scut∑
n,m=0
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
(
Nclick,nm,ss|Z + δssZ,nm
)− δjAjBZ + ∆jAjBssZ ,
Nclick,jAjB|Z ≤
Scut∑
n,m=0
pjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m
pspspsnp
s
m
(
Nclick,nm,ss|Z + δssZ,nm
)− δjAjBZ + ∆jAjBssZ
+NZpjApjBT
jAjB
Scut
,
−pjApjBNZ
∞∑
n,m=0
pjAn p
jB
mD
jAjB,ss
Z,nm ≤ ∆jAjBssZ ≤ pjApjBNZ
∞∑
n,m=0
pjAn p
jB
mD
jAjB,ss
Z,nm ,
−∆jAjBZ ≤ δjAjBZ ≤ ∆ˆjAjBZ , −∆ssZ ≤ δssZ ≤ ∆ˆssZ , −∆ssZ,nm ≤ δssZ,nm ≤ ∆ˆssZ,nm,
(19)
where jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w} and jAjB 6= ss. The unknown variables in the linear program above are:
Nclick,nm,ss|Z, δssZ,nm, δ
ss
Z , δ
jAjB
Z , and ∆
jAjBss
Z . The calculation of the parameters D
jAjB,ss
Z,nm is presented
in Appendix A.
The solution to the linear program above is exactly NLclick,00,ss|Z, with a total error probability
εZ,00 =
∑
jA,jB=s,v,w
(
εjAjBZ + εˆ
jAjB
Z
)
+
Scut∑
n,m=0
(
εssZ,nm + εˆ
ss
Z,nm
)
, (20)
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where εjAjBZ and εˆ
jAjB
Z are the error probabilities associated with the estimation of the bounds on
δjAjBZ with jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w}. The terms εssZ,nm and εˆssZ,nm are the error probabilities associated with
the estimation of the bounds on δssZ,nm.
To estimate the parameterNLclick,11,ss|Z, one can reuse the same linear program given by Eq. (19)
after replacing the objective with “min Nclick,11,ss|Z”.
The steps to estimate the phase error rate eUph are as follows. First, one can redo the analysis
above for those “click” events in the relay which are associated with an error (see [24, 25]). That is,
now we focus on the quantities Eerror,nm,jAjB|χ which denote the expected number of events when
Alice and Bob select the intensity settings γjA and γjB to send an n-photon pulse and an m-photon
pulse, respectively, and the relay’s detectors provide a click corresponding to an error given that
both Alice and Bob select the χ basis. In addition, we can use the fact that 0 ≤ Eerror,nm,jAjB|χ ≤
NχpjApjBp
jA
n p
jB
m for all n, m and jA, jB ∈ {s, v,w}. In so doing, one can obtain constraints on
error events which are similar to the ones given by Eq. (18). Second, with these equations as well
as the constraints given by Eq. (19) but now applied to the X basis events, one can estimate a lower
bound on the number of single-photon click events when both Alice and Bob select the intensity
setting γs given that they both select the X basis, which we denote by NLclick,11,ss|X, as well as an
upper bound on the corresponding number of errors, NUerror,11,ss|X.
Note that the derivation of NLclick,11,ss|X is similar to the one of N
L
click,11,ss|Z. For this, one can
use the linear program used to estimate NLclick,11,ss|Z after replacing all the parameters and variables
in the Z basis with the corresponding ones in the X basis. Similarly, one can further modify
the program for NLclick,11,ss|X to calculate N
U
error,11,ss|X. Specifically, one can simply replace all the
numbers of click events with those of error events. In addition, one replaces “min Nclick,11,ss|X”
with “max Nerror,11,ss|X” to obtain an upper bound on Nerror,11,ss|X. Finally, given the values of
NLclick,11,ss|Z, N
L
click,11,ss|X and N
U
error,11,ss|X, one can use a random sampling argument to relate the
number of errors in the single-photon events in the X basis to the number of phase errors associated
with the single-photon events in the Z basis and thus estimate eUph [27, 39]. More precisely, by
using Serfling’s inequality [40], we obtain that
eUph =
1
NL
click,11,ss|Z
min
{[
NLclick,11,ss|Z
NU
error,11,ss|X
NL
click,11,ss|X
+
(
NLclick,11,ss|Z +N
L
click,11,ss|X
)
×Υ
(
NLclick,11,ss|Z, N
L
click,11,ss|X, ε
′
)]
, NLclick,11,ss|Z
}
,
(21)
except for a failure probability
εph,11 ≤ ε′ + εX,11 + εEX,11, (22)
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where the function Υ (x, y, z) is defined as Υ (x, y, z) =
√
(x+ 1) ln (z−1) / [2y (x+ y)], and
εX,11 and εEX,11 are the failure probabilities corresponding to the estimation of N
L
click,11,ss|X and
NUerror,11,ss|X, respectively.
B. THA against the phase modulator
A THA against the PM might render Alice’s and Bob’s output states (which now also contain
Eve’s systems) basis dependent. As a result, Eve might be able to learn partial information about
Alice’s and Bob’s basis and bit value choices each given time. The security of the standard BB84
protocol with a basis-dependent flaw has been analyzed in a previous work [41] by using the idea
of a quantum coin [42, 43]. This idea was then generalized to phase encoding schemes for MDI-
QKD where both Alice and Bob have basis-dependent flaws [44]. Here, to estimate the phase error
rate in the presence of a THA against the PM, we apply the method introduced in Ref. [44] to our
protocol.
1. The Asymptotic Limit
To simplify the analysis, let us first consider a scenario where Alice’s and Bob’s light sources
are both ideal single-photon sources. Also, let us assume that Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices
are random and do not depend on the IM or on previous emitted pulses. Let |ΨiZ〉A,E and
|ΨiZ〉B,E (|ΨiX〉A,E and |ΨiX〉B,E) denote the states that Alice and Bob prepare (in an equivalent
entanglement-based scenario) in the Z (X) basis together with Eve’s system from a THA in the
ith trial of the protocol. The subscripts A, B and E denote the systems of Alice, Bob and Eve,
respectively. As already mentioned, here we consider a virtual entanglement scenario where each
of Alice and Bob prepares a bipartite entangled state and then measures one of the two systems
to actually prepare the states that are sent to the relay. More precisely, the system A (B) above
contains a virtual qubit Aq (Bq) indicating Alice’s (Bob’s) bit value choice, and Alice’s (Bob’s)
photonic system Ap (Bp) that is sent to the relay via the quantum channel. In addition, the system
A (B) could also contain an ancilla system Aa (Ba) stored in Alice’s (Bob’s) lab to account for the
loss in the transmitter. And Eve’s system E corresponds to the back-reflected light from a THA.
That is, the system A ≡ AqApAa and it is similar for B. All these quantum systems are listed in
Table. II.
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TABLE II: Quantum systems defined in a THA against the PM
∣∣ΨiZ〉A,E (∣∣ΨiZ〉B,E) The state that Alice (Bob) prepares in the Z basis together with Eve’s systemin the ith trial of the protocol
∣∣ΨiX〉A,E (∣∣ΨiX〉B,E) The state that Alice (Bob) prepares in the X basis together with Eve’s systemin the ith trial of the protocol
Aq (Bq) A virtual qubit that contains Alice’s (Bob’s) bit value choice
Ap (Bp) Alice’s (Bob’s) photonic system that is sent to the relay via a quantum channel
Aa (Ba)
An additional ancilla system stored in Alice’s (Bob’s) lab to account for the
loss in the transmitter
E The back-reflected light from Eve’s THA
The phase error rate is the fictitious bit error rate that Alice and Bob would obtain if they would
measure the systems Aq and Bq in the X basis, given that they prepared the states |ΨiZ〉A,E and
|ΨiZ〉B,E, respectively. In order to estimate the phase error rate in the presence of information
leakage from the PM, we consider a fictitious protocol where we assume that Alice and Bob meet
together [44] and they decide the basis choices by measuring a so-called quantum coin [42, 43].
Particularly, we assume that in the ith trial of this protocol, Alice and Bob first prepare a joint state
|Ψi〉 ≡ pZ|0Z〉Aba |0Z〉Ac |ΨiZ〉A,E|ΨiZ〉B,E + pX|0Z〉Aba|1Z〉Ac |ΨiX〉A,E|ΨiX〉B,E
+
√
pZpX
(
|1Z〉Aba |0Z〉Ac |ΨiZ〉A,E|ΨiX〉B,E + |1Z〉Aba |1Z〉Ac |ΨiX〉A,E|ΨiZ〉B,E
)
,
(23)
where
|ΨiZ〉A,E ≡ 1√2
(
|0Z〉Aq
∣∣Ψi0,Z〉A′,E + |1Z〉Aq∣∣Ψi1,Z〉A′,E) ,
|ΨiX〉A,E ≡ 1√2
(
|0Z〉Aq
∣∣Ψi0,X〉A′,E + |1Z〉Aq∣∣Ψi1,X〉A′,E) ,
|ΨiZ〉B,E ≡ 1√2
(
|0Z〉Bq
∣∣Ψi0,Z〉B′,E + |1Z〉Bq∣∣Ψi1,Z〉B′,E) ,
|ΨiX〉B,E ≡ 1√2
(
|0Z〉Bq
∣∣Ψi0,X〉B′,E + |1Z〉Bq∣∣Ψi1,X〉B′,E) .
(24)
In Eq. (23), the first system Aba denotes a system in Alice’s hands which decides whether or not
Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices match by measuring it in the Z basis. More precisely, if she obtains
the measurement outcome corresponding to |0Z〉Aba (|1Z〉Aba), then Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices
(do not) match. The relay can perform any operation on each received signal pair from Alice and
Bob to decide in which rounds there will be “click” events. For each click event, the relay then
performs some measurement on the received signal pair and both Alice and Bob measure their
systems Aq and Bq in the X basis. Besides, Alice selects the ZAc or XAc basis with probabilities
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pZAc and pXAc , respectively, to measure her quantum coin, denoted by the system Ac in Eq. (23)
in the selected basis. In Eq. (24), the system A′ is defined as A′ ≡ ApAa and the definition of the
system B′ is similar.
After applying the Bloch sphere bound [45] to this fictitious scenario, we obtain
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click, sb,X− error,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,X− error,ZAc )
×
√
1− Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,X− error,ZAc ),
(25)
and
1− 2Pri (XAc = − |click, sb,No X− error,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,No X− error,ZAc )
×
√
1− Pri (ZAc = 1 |click, sb,No X− error,ZAc ),
(26)
where Pri (XAc = − |click, sb, X− error,XAc ) is the conditional probability that in the ith trial
Alice’s X basis measurement result on the quantum coin is ‘−’ given that the relay obtains a
successful result in his measurement device, Alice and Bob select the same basis (sb) for the state
preparation, Bob’s X basis measurement outcome on Bq differs from that obtained by Alice when
she measures her system Aq in the X basis (which we call an ‘X− error’), and Alice performs the
XAc basis measurement on the quantum coin. The other conditional probabilities that appear in
Eqs. (25) and (26) are defined similarly.
Then, we multiply Eq. (25) by
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (sb,X− error |click,XAc )
= Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (sb,X− error |click,ZAc ) ,
(27)
and we multiply Eq. (26) by
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (sb,No X− error |click,XAc )
= Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (sb,No X− error |click,ZAc ) .
(28)
After adding both results together, we obtain
Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (sb |click,XAc )− 2Pri (ZAc |click) Pri (XAc = −, sb |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,X− error,ZAc |click) Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,X− error,ZAc |click)
+2
√
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,No X− error,ZAc |click) Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,No X− error,ZAc |click).
(29)
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Note that Pri (ZAc |click) = pZAc for any round ‘i’ and we also have Pri (sb |click,XAc ) =
Pri (sb |click). To relate the probabilities in Eq. (29) to the expected numbers of events, we take
the sum over i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nclick}, where Nclick is the number of click events. Due to the concavity
of the square root function, we have that
pZAc
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (sb |click)− 2pZAc
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (XAc = −, sb |click,XAc )
≤ 2
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,X− error,ZAc |click)
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,X− error,ZAc |click)
+2
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,No X− error,ZAc |click)
×
√
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,No X− error,ZAc |click).
(30)
In Eq. (30), we have that
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (sb |click) = Esb|click, with Esb|click being the expected number
of events where Alice and Bob select the same basis given that there is a click. Also, we have that
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (XAc = −, sb |click,XAc ) =
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (sb |click,XAc ) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc , sb)
=
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (sb |click) Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc , sb).
(31)
Note that, although in the actual protocol there is no data corresponding to the event ‘XAc = −’,
we can still upper bound the probability Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc , sb). For this, we assume a
worst-case scenario where we take the maximum value of this probability in the total number N
of rounds. More precisely, we have that
Pri (XAc = − |click,XAc , sb) ≤ max
j∈{1,2,...N}
Prj (XAc = − |XAc , sb)
= 1
2
{
1− 2pZpX
p2Z+p
2
X
min
j∈{1,2,...N}
Re
(
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
A,E
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
B,E
)}
≡ ∆XAc=−.
(32)
The detailed calculation of the probability Prj (XAc = − |XAc , sb) can be found in Appendix B.
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Let us denote
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,X− error,ZAc |click) = EX,X−error,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,X− error,ZAc |click) = EZ,X−error,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 1, sb,No X− error,ZAc |click) = EX,No X−error,
Nclick∑
i=1
Pri (ZAc = 0, sb,No X− error,ZAc |click) = EZ,No X−error.
(33)
Then Eq. (30) can be written as
pZAcEsb|click
(
1− 2∆XAc=−
) ≤ 2√EX,X−errorEZ,X−error + 2√EX,No X−errorEZ,No X−error. (34)
Eq. (34) gives the mathematical relation between the expected number of events in the
asymptotic limit. Next we will explain how to extend Eq. (34) to the actual protocol in the finite-
key regime by applying Azuma’s inequality.
2. The Finite-Key Regime
Here, we apply Azuma’s inequality [36] again to relate the expected numbers of events to the
corresponding actual numbers of events. Let Nλ denote the actual number of times that the event
‘λ’ occurs in Nclick trials.
Then Eq. (34) can be rewritten as
pZAc
(
Nsb|click − δsb|click
) (
1− 2∆XAc=−
)
≤ 2√(NX,X−error + δX,X−error) (NZ,X−error + δZ,X−error)
+2
√
(Nclick,X −NX,X−error + δX,No X−error) (Nclick,Z −NZ,X−error + δZ,No X−error)
, (35)
except for an exponentially small error probability
∑
λ
(ελ + εˆλ), where λ ∈ {(sb|click), (X,X −
error), (Z,X− error), (X,No X− error), (Z,No X− error)}. In Eq. (35), Nclick,Z(X) denotes the
actual number of events when the relay obtains a successful measurement result and Alice and
Bob select the Z (X) basis, i.e., Nclick,Z(X) = NZ(X),X−error +NZ(X),No X−error. Finally, NZ,X−error is
the quantity to be estimated, i.e., the actual number of phase errors.
So far we have considered that Alice and Bob have single-photon sources, however,
it is straightforward to adapt the analysis above to the MDI-QKD protocol described
in Sec. II based on phase randomized WCPs. Since the final key is only distilled
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from the data associated with the signal intensity setting, we only need to consider that
now all the actual numbers in Eq. (35) actually represent the single-photon contributions
within Zss. More precisely,
{
Nsb|click, NX,X−error, NZ,X−error, Nclick,X, Nclick,Z
}
now refer
to
{
Nsb,11,ss|click, NX−error,11,ss|X, NX−error,11,ss|Z, Nclick,11,ss|X, Nclick,11,ss|Z
}
, where Nsb,11,ss|click
denotes the actual number of events where Alice and Bob both select the same basis and the
intensity setting γs and send a single photon state given that the relay obtains a successful
measurement result. This replacement is allowed because in principle Alice and Bob can perform
a quantum non-demolition measurement to know in which pulse each of them emits a single-
photon, and we can apply the analysis above to such instances. As long as we do not use explicity
in which instance Alice and Bob emit a single-photon, which is exactly the case in our analysis,
the security follows.
Then we can rewrite Eq. (35) as follows:
pZAc
(
Nsb,11,ss|click − δsb,11,ss|click
) (
1− 2∆XAc=−
)
≤ 2
√(
NX−error,11,ss|X + δX−error,11,ss|X
) (
NX−error,11,ss|Z + δX−error,11,ss|Z
)
+2
√(
Nclick,11,ss|X −NX−error,11,ss|X + δNo X−error,11,ss|X
)
×
√(
Nclick,11,ss|Z −NX−error,11,ss|Z + δNo X−error,11,ss|Z
)
.
(36)
Since we have that Nsb,11,ss|click = Nclick,11,ss|Z + Nclick,11,ss|X ≥ 2
√
Nclick,11,ss|ZNclick,11,ss|X, if we
divide the LHS of Eq. (36) by Nsb,11,ss|click and RHS of Eq. (36) by 2
√
Nclick,11,ss|ZNclick,11,ss|X,
respectively, then we obtain that
pZAc
(
1− δsb,11,ss|click
Nsb,11,ss|click
) (
1− 2∆XAc=−
)
≤
√
(NX−error,11,ss|X +δX−error,11,ss|X )
Nclick,11,ss|X
(NX−error,11,ss|Z +δX−error,11,ss|Z )
Nclick,11,ss|Z
+
√(
1− NNo X−error,11,ss|X−δNo X−error,11,ss|X
Nclick,11,ss|X
)(
1− NNo X−error,11,ss|Z +δNo X−error,11,ss|Z
Nclick,11,ss|Z
)
,
(37)
also holds except for a small failure probability.
To solve Eq. (37) one can use the same procedure based on the linear optimization
method that we employed in the previous section to first estimate the quantities{
Nsb,11,ss|click, NX−error,11,ss|X, Nclick,11,ss|X, Nclick,11,ss|Z
}
. Note that, although the relation
Nsb,11,ss|click = Nclick,11,ss|Z + Nclick,11,ss|X holds in terms of the actual numbers, to estimate an
upper bound on the number of phase errors by using Eq. (37), we need to obtain either a lower
bound or an upper bound on each of these three parameters. This means that, we need to estimate
these three parameters independently. Also, we set pZAc as input and search for its optimal value
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by using a Monte Carlo method. For each given value of pZAc , the only unknown variable in
Eq. (37) is NX−error,11,ss|Z, which can be numerically estimated by using the optimization toolbox
of Matlab.
IV. SIMULATION OF THE SECRET KEY RATE
In the simulation, only for illustration purposes we assume a particular example of THA, which
is shown in Fig. 2. Eve sends Alice (Bob) two high intensity single-mode coherent pulses, each of
which is denoted by
∣∣βEeiθE〉, with βE representing the amplitude and θE the phase of the coherent
state. One of them targets the IM and the other one targets the PM. For simplicity and due to the
lack of experimental data, we shall also assume that the back-reflected light from both the IM and
the PM to Eve is still in a coherent state. We further assume that the back-reflected light from
the IM has the form
∣∣βreiθr〉, where the values of the parameters βr and θr depend on Alice’s and
Bob’s intensity settings each given time with r ∈ {s, v,w}, and the back-reflected light from the
PM is given by
∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉, where Imax is the maximum intensity of the back-reflected light and
χ ∈ {Z, X} refers to the basis choice. Note that, here for simplicity and in order to compare
our simulation results with those in [25], we assume that Eve’s back-reflected light from the PM
only contains the basis information. That is, we assume that |Ψi0,Z〉A′,E = |Ψi0,Z〉A′ ⊗ |φZ〉E and
|Ψi1,Z〉A′,E = |Ψi1,Z〉A′ ⊗ |φZ〉E, where the state |φZ〉E=|
√
Imaxe
iθZ〉 of Eve’s back-reflected light is
the same for both bit values (and similarly for the X basis). To learn partial information about the
intensity settings, Eve can measure the state
∣∣βreiθr〉, and to learn partial information about the
basis choices, Eve can measure the state
∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉. We emphasize, however, that this is just a
particular model of a THA that we use to evaluate the secret key rate. Our security analysis can be
applied to any THA.
We remark that incorporating the information leakage about the bit value is straightforward and
our results remain exactly the same even if we include the information leakage about the bit value
as long as the fidelities are the same, i.e., as long as the value of ∆XAc=− is unchanged.
In the presence of information leakage, the actual secret key length, `′, is bounded by
`′ ≥ max
ΓAB
min
ΓE
`, (38)
where ` is given by Eq. (2). Here, ΓAB and ΓE denote the spaces of the parameters controlled by
Alice and Bob, and by Eve, respectively. In the simulation, we assume a practically reasonable
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FIG. 2: Example of a THA against the IM and the PM of Alice (Bob). Eve sends Alice (Bob) two high intensity
single-mode coherent pulses, each of which is denoted by
∣∣βEeiθE〉. One of them targets the IM and the other one
targets the PM. We further assume for simplicity that the back-reflected light from the IM and the PM to Eve is in a
product state of two coherent states. One comes from the IM, which we denote by
∣∣βreiθr〉, and the other comes from
the PM, which has the form
∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉, where r and χ refer to the intensity setting and basis choice, respectively,
with r ∈ {s, v,w} and χ ∈ {Z,X}. Eve can learn partial information about the intensity settings and the basis choices
by separately measuring the states
∣∣βreiθr〉 and ∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉.
TABLE III: Experimental parameters used in the simulations. The parameter ed is the intrinsic error rate due to the
misalignment of the MDI-QKD system; pd is the dark count rate of the relay’s detectors, which we assume is equal
for all of them; ηdet is the overall detection efficiency of the relay’s receiver; α is the loss coefficient of the channel
measured in dB/km; and fEC is the efficiency of the error correction code.
ed pd ηdet α fEC
1% 5× 10−6 0.25 0.2 1.2
value for the weakest decoy state, γw = 5× 10−4, and, without loss of generality, we assume that
θs = 0. The experimental parameters used in the simulations are listed in Table III.
Below we present the simulation results of the secret key rate in three practical cases within
the framework of the THA described above. Each case corresponds to a particular model for the
back-reflected light.
A. Case 1
In the framework of the THA considered, it is clear that the higher the intensity of the back-
reflected light is, the more information Eve can extract. In this first example, we evaluate a worst-
case scenario, where Alice and Bob may overestimate the intensity of the back-reflected light
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FIG. 3: Case 1. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of the total
number of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation where there is
no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. More precisely, the colored solid (dotted) lines represent the secret key rates in the presence of a THA against
the IM (both the IM and the PM). (b) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed
value of information leakage, Imax = 10−16, from only the IM. Different colored lines correspond to different values
of the number of transmitted pulses. In our simulations, for each value of the distance we maximize the secret key rate
over the amplitudes γs and γv, and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv and pZ which are controlled by Alice and Bob, and
we minimize it over the angles θr and θχ controlled by Eve, respectively. That is, we consider the worst-case scenario
where the phases θr and θχ are selected such that they provide maximal information to Eve.
leaked to Eve. In particular, we suppose that the intensity βr2 is always upper bounded by a
certain value Imax for all r and we conservatively assume that
βs
2 = βv
2 = βw
2 = Imax. (39)
The simulation result of the secret key rate, `′/N , as a function of the transmission distance
between Alice and Bob in this case is shown in Fig. 3 (a) for a fixed value of the total number
of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. In this figure, the black solid line represents the key rate in the
situation where there is no information leakage, namely Imax = 0, and the different colored lines
correspond to different amounts of information leakage. More precisely, the colored solid lines
represent the key rates in the presence of a THA against only the IM. If we compare these results
with the longest achievable distance without information leakage, which is about 88 km, we find
that now the secret key rate vanishes at about 48 km even when Imax is as small as 10−13. The
colored dotted lines represent the secret key rates in the presence of a THA against both the IM
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and the PM. Now the secret key rates are obviously lower than the ones corresponding to a THA
against only the IM. For example, when Imax = 10−13 the secret key rate now vanishes at only 30
km.
As already observed in the finite-key analysis for decoy-state QKD [25], here we also find that
in MDI-QKD Alice and Bob need to discard part of their data (on average about NpXAc pulse
pairs) to estimate the phase error rate when there is information leakage from the PM. In our
simulation, we find that the optimal value of pZAc typically lies in the interval [0.65, 0.9]. Note
that, compared to the simulation result in [25], we have that the value of pZAc is typically smaller
in the MDI-QKD protocol, which means that MDI-QKD has to sacrifice a bigger proportion of
data than in the case of the standard decoy-state QKD protocol to estimate the phase error rate.
Also, we find that MDI-QKD seems to be more sensitive to information leakage. In order to
obtain a certain performance, the value of Imax in MDI-QKD is much smaller than that in standard
decoy-state QKD (indeed, the value of Imax in MDI-QKD is roughly the square of that in standard
decoy-state QKD). The main reason for this behavior is that in MDI-QKD there are two leaky
sources (Alice and Bob) instead of only one leaky source as is the case in standard decoy-state
QKD. Thus, to implement the MDI-QKD protocol, both Alice and Bob need to carefully isolate
their devices from the external environment to guarantee the security of the system.
In Fig. 3 (b), the different colored lines show the secret key rate as a function of the distance
for a fixed value Imax = 10−16 and for different total numbers of transmitted pulses. Here, for
simplicity, we only plot the key rates against information leakage from the IM and omit the results
when there is also information leakage from the PM as they are similar to those shown in Fig. 3 (b).
That is, in this figure we can see the effect of the information leakage as a function of the number
of transmitted pulses. For example, when Imax = 10−16, the longest achievable distance is about
84 km when the total number of transmitted pulses is N = 1015. However, when N = 1012, this
distance decreases to 32 km. Our results indicate that the finite-key effect has a much bigger impact
on the secret key rate in the presence of information leakage [27]. The reason for this is mainly
that, in order to estimate the statistical fluctuations for a finite sampling size in the presence of
information leakage from the IM, our methodology relies on applying Azuma’s inequality [36] to
the total number of transmitted pulses. In contrast, when there is no information leakage from the
IM, one can apply Azuma’s inequality to the number of pulses detected. This is so because in this
latter case, one can assume a counterfactual scenario where Alice and Bob select their intensity
settings a posteriori, i.e., after the relay has detected the successful events. As a consequence,
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FIG. 4: The ratio (`′Imax>0/`
′
Imax=0
) between the secret key rates in logarithmic scale with and without information
leakage as a function of the distance for two fixed positive values of Imax = {10−13, 10−20}. The solid (dotted) lines
represent the case Imax = 10−20 (Imax = 10−13). Different colored lines correspond to different values of N .
the performance of MDI-QKD in the finite-key regime is comparatively worse in the presence of
information leakage from the IM. Note that for the case of information leakage from the PM, we
actually apply Azuma’s inequality to the number of the detected events.
To further illustrate how the information leakage affects the secret key rate as a function of
the number of transmitted pulses, in Fig. 4 we plot the ratio (`′Imax>0/`
′
Imax=0
) between the secret
key rates for two fixed positive values of information leakage, Imax = {10−13, 10−20} and those
when Imax = 0 (i.e., when there is no information leakage) for different values of N . Here, for
simplicity, we disregard again the information leakage from the PM. From Fig. 4 one can see
that given a fixed distance and a fixed value of N , the ratio when Imax = 10−13 is at least one
order of magnitude lower than that when Imax = 10−20. And the ratio when Imax = 10−13 drops
faster as the distance increases than that when Imax = 10−20. For instance, if we focus on the
red lines, from 0 km to 30 km, the ratio drops from about 10−1 to 10−3 when Imax = 10−13 (i.e.,
two orders of magnitude) while the ratio drops only from 0.71 to 0.49 (i.e., of the same order of
magnitude) when Imax = 10−20. This suggests that the effect of information leakage increases
when N decreases, and the finite-size effect is amplified when the amount of information leakage
increases. We remark that the simulation results for the other two cases that we consider next are
analogous to those of Fig. 4 and thus we omit them in the next two subsections.
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FIG. 5: Case 2. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of the total
number of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation where there is
no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. More precisely, the colored solid (dotted) lines represent the secret key rates in the presence of a THA against
the IM (both the IM and the PM). (b) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed
value of information leakage, Imax = 10−16, from only the IM. Different colored lines correspond to different values
of the number of transmitted pulses. In our simulations, for each value of the distance we maximize the secret key rate
over the amplitudes γs and γv, and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv and pZ which are controlled by Alice and Bob, and
we minimize it over the angles θr and θχ controlled by Eve, respectively. That is, we consider the worst-case scenario
where the phases θr and θχ are selected such that they provide maximal information to Eve.
B. Case 2
In the previous case, we considered a conservative scenario for Alice and Bob, where the
intensity of the back-reflected light is maximal and independent of the settings of the IM. Thus,
the amount of information leaked might be overestimated, which results in a relatively pessimistic
lower bound on the secret key rate. However, in practice, the input light of Eve may also go through
the IM. As a consequence, the back-reflected light could be modulated in the same manner as the
senders’ pulses during the state preparation process. In this case, we have that
βs
2 =
γs
γv
βv
2 =
γs
γw
βw
2 = Imax. (40)
That is, here we assume that the maximum amount of information leakage comes from the
largest intensity setting of the senders, namely Imax = βs2. The intensity of the back-reflected
light corresponding to the other intensity settings fulfills the conditions: βs2/βv2 = γs/γv and
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βs
2/βw
2 = γs/γw.
The simulation result of the secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance between
Alice and Bob when N = 1014 and for different values of Imax is shown in Fig. 5 (a). Fig. 5 (b)
shows the secret key rate as a function of the distance in the presence of information leakage (with
a fixed value of Imax = 10−16) from only the IM and for different values of N . The behavior of
the curves is very similar to those in Case 1, and in the simulation we find that the optimized value
of pZAc is similar as well. One main difference is that with the same experimental parameters the
secret key rate is now a little bit higher and can go a bit further than that in Case 1. For example,
when the total number of transmitted pulses is 1014 and Imax = 10−13, we find that the secret key
is positive up to about 54 km while in Case 1 this distance is 48 km in the presence of information
leakage only from the IM.
C. Case 3
In this case we consider a more favorable situation for Alice and Bob where they implement
an additional step to randomize the phase of each signal going out of their transmitters including
the back-reflected light to Eve. Moreover, we optimistically assume that there is no information
leakage from this phase randomization step. Furthermore, we suppose that the amplitudes βk still
satisfy Eq. (40) like in the previous case. Then, we have that the state of Eve’s back-reflected light
from the IM and the PM are given by:
ργk = e
−(βk)2
∞∑
n=0
(βk)
2
n!
|n〉〈n|,
ρImax = e
−Imax
∞∑
n=0
Imax
n!
|n〉〈n|,
(41)
respectively.
This means that the information about Alice’s and Bob’s inner settings can only be leaked via
the amplitudes of the back-reflected light but Eve cannot obtain any information from the phases.
We remark that here we consider a model which is different from the ones considered in previous
works [24, 25]. To be precise, in Refs. [24, 25] the authors consider that the phase randomization
step is only applied to the back-reflected light from the IM. However, here we consider that this
step is applied to the back-reflected light from both the IM and the PM. This means that, now Eve
cannot exploit any information leakage from the PM, but only information leakage from the IM as
the state ρImax does not depend on the basis choice. Thus, in this situation, the resulting secret key
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rate when Eve only attacks the IM and that corresponding to the case where Eve attacks both the
IM and the PM coincide.
The simulation result of the secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance between
Alice and Bob when N = 1014 and for different values of Imax is shown in Fig. 6 (a). Fig. 6 (b)
shows the finite-key effect on the secret key rate as a function of the distance for a fixed value of
Imax = 10
−8 and for different values of N . Here, we find that the typical interval where pZAc lies
is [0.71, 0.93]. Compared to the secret key rate shown in Figs 3 and 5, now the secret key rate is
obviously improved. For example, when the total number of transmitted pulses is N = 1014 and
Imax = 10
−7, the secret key rate remains positive up to about 62 km. In comparison, the maximum
achievable distance with the same number of transmitted pulses and assuming an Imax as low as
10−13 is only about 36 km in Case 2, and it is even worse in Case 1.
In practice, however, Eve might also perform a THA against the phase randomization step to
obtain some information about the random phase applied by Alice and Bob each given time. This
will reduce the benefit of the phase randomization step. One can also analyze this last scenario
with the techniques in this paper, but for simplicity we omit it here.
V. THE FOUR-INTENSITY DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
In this section, we now consider the MDI-QKD protocol introduced in [28], which has been
recently implemented over a record distance of 404 km [20] (we note that the current record is
421 km [46]). In that protocol, each of Alice and Bob uses one intensity setting γs for the Z basis
states, and three intensity settings γv, γw and γ0 = 0 for the X basis states. This is motivated
by the fact that in order to increase the number of single-photon pulses emitted in the Z basis
used for key generation, the intensity of the signal states, γs, needs to be close to one, while in
order to have a tight estimation of the relevant parameters, the intensities in the X basis used for
parameter estimation need to be weak. With the four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol,
one can optimize the intensities for key generation and parameter estimation independently. The
probabilities to select the corresponding intensities are ps, pv, pw and p0, respectively, with ps +
pv +pw +p0 = 1. Note that the probability to choose the Z basis is now pZ = ps and the probability
to choose the X basis is given by pX = pv + pw + p0.
The security analysis of this protocol against information leakage from the IM and the PM
is slightly different from that in the previous section. This is because of the following. Since
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FIG. 6: Case 3. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of the total
number of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation where there is
no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. Here, the case where Eve attacks only the IM and the case where Eve attacks both the IM and the PM
coincide. (b) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of information
leakage, Imax = 10−8. Different colored lines correspond to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. In
our simulations, for each value of the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs and γv, and the
probabilities pZAc , ps, pv and pZ which are controlled by Alice and Bob.
now the intensity setting in the Z basis is unique and it is typically different from the intensity
settings in the X basis, by analyzing the information leakage from the IM Eve can also learn
partial information about the users’ basis choices. Similarly, by analyzing the information leakage
from the PM Eve can learn partial information about the users’ intensity settings as well. That
is, the information leakage from the IM and the PM of each user is now correlated. Fortunately,
a general procedure to estimate the relevant parameters in this situation has already been briefly
introduced in Ref. [24]. It applies the quantum coin idea to estimate the phase error rate, together
with a similar “post-selection step” like that employed in [25] where Alice post-selects part of her
data (with probability pZAc ) and discards the other part.
In what follows, for illustration purposes we consider a particular example of a THA against
the correlated IM and PM performed by Eve, which is shown in Fig. 7. For comparison purposes,
we use the same assumptions in this THA like those in Sec. IV. That is, we suppose that Eve sends
Alice (Bob) two high intensity single-mode coherent pulses, each of which is denoted by
∣∣βEeiθE〉.
One of them targets the IM and the other one targets the PM. And the state of the back-reflected
29
light from the IM has the form
∣∣βreiθr〉 and the one from the PM is ∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉, where r and χ
refer to the intensity setting and basis choice, respectively, with r ∈ {s, v,w, 0} and χ ∈ {Z,X}.
Now, since the IM and the PM are correlated, in this THA Eve can jointly measure the states∣∣βreiθr〉 and ∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉 to extract partial information about both the intensity settings and the
basis choices. Importantly, to have a fair comparison with the simulation results shown in Sec. IV,
we assume that the amount of information leaked to Eve in both protocols is the same. That is, we
assume that the intensity of the back-reflected light is equal in both cases. In addition, in this THA
we assume, for example, that Eve splits the joint back-reflected light (from both the IM and the
PM together, which can be described with the product state
∣∣βreiθr〉⊗ ∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉) into two parts
by means of a 50:50 beamsplitter, one part is used to learn partial information about the intensity
settings and the other part is used to learn partial information about the basis choices. We remark,
however, that our method to estimate the phase error rate could be applied to any strategy applied
by Eve.
Note that, in general, when the IM and the PM are correlated, the yields associated with
different photon number states can also depend on the bit value [24]. However, for simplicity,
in the model above we assume that the back-reflected light does not carry information about the
bit value. This latter case is briefly discussed in Appendix C.
A. Estimation of the parameters NLclick,00,ss and N
L
click,11,ss
In this section, we present the procedure to estimate the parameters NLclick,00,ss|Z and N
L
click,11,ss|Z
which are needed to evaluate the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (2). Due to the fact that in
this protocol the intensity γs is only used for the data in the Z basis, we have that NLclick,00,ss|Z ≡
NLclick,00,ss and N
L
click,11,ss|Z ≡ NLclick,11,ss, where NLclick,00,ss (NLclick,11,ss) is a lower bound on the
number of events where Alice and Bob both select the intensity γs and send a vacuum (single-
photon) pulse, and the relay obtains a successful measurement result. In the MDI-QKD protocol
introduced in [28], the data in the Z basis is used for key distillation and the data in the X basis is
used for parameter estimation, and we first estimate the quantitiesNLclick,00,vv andN
L
click,11,vv, which
correspond to the intensity γv only in the X basis. For this we use the same techniques, like in
the previous section, which rely on the trace distance argument among events only in the X basis.
More precisely, the quantitiesNLclick,00,vv andN
L
click,11,vv can be estimated by applying similar linear
programming techniques with all the sifted data in the X basis as what has been done in Sec. III A.
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FIG. 7: Example of a THA against correlated IM and PM of Alice (Bob). Eve sends Alice (Bob) two high intensity
single-mode coherent pulses, each of which is denoted by
∣∣βEeiθE〉. One of them targets the IM and the other one
targets the PM. We further assume for simplicity that the back-reflected light from the IM and the PM to Eve is in a
product state of two coherent states. One comes from the IM, which we denote by
∣∣βreiθr〉, and the other comes from
the PM, which has the form
∣∣√Imaxeiθχ〉, where r and χ refer to the intensity setting and basis choice, respectively,
with r ∈ {s, v,w, 0} and χ ∈ {Z,X} for the MDI-QKD protocol introduced in [28]. In addition, for simplicity, we
assume that Eve splits the joint back-reflected light (from both the IM and the PM together) into two parts by means
of a 50:50 beamsplitter, one part is used to learn partial information about the intensity settings and the other part is
used to learn partial information about the basis choices.
This analysis is valid because we can imagine a fictitious delayed measurement scenario in which
Alice and Bob determine the basis first, and then for the events where both of them use the X basis,
Alice and Bob start to choose the intensity settings. Note that since this estimation only involves
events in the X basis, it is not affected by the information leakage from the PM. Next, we can
relate these two quantities to the parameters NLclick,00,ss and N
L
click,11,ss, respectively, by using the
trace distance argument between the X and Z basis states. For example, in Eqs. (6)-(8) if we focus
on the total number of events N instead of on the Nχ events where both Alice and Bob select the
χ basis and take n = m = 0, jA = jB = s and kA = kB = v, we have that
Eclick,00,ss = p
2
s (p
s
0)
2
p2v(p
v
0)
2Eclick,00,vv + ∆ssvv00 , (42)
where Eclick,00,vv is the expected number of events where both Alice and Bob select the intensity
setting γv and send a vacuum pulse and the relay obtains a successful event. Note that,
Eclick,00,vv ≡ Eclick,00,vv|X as the intensity setting γv is only selected in the X basis. The quantity
Eclick,00,ss is defined in an analogous way and it is equal to Eclick,00,ss|Z. The deviation term
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∆ssvv00 ∈ [−p2s (ps0)2NDss,vv00 , p2s (ps0)2NDss,vv00 ], where
Dss,vv00 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Dss,vv,i00 :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Tr
[√(
ργ
sγs,i
00 − ργ
vγv,i
00
)2]
(43)
with ργ
vγv,i
00 (ρ
γsγs,i
00 ) being the normalized joint state of both Alice’s and Bob’s vacuum pulses
when they both select the intensity setting γv (γs) together with the systems EAa , E
B
a , E
A′
p , E
B′
p in
the ith trial. The definitions of EAa , E
B
a , E
A′
p and E
B′
p are the same as those of Sec. III A. Next we
apply Azuma’s inequality to Eq. (42) and obtain
Nclick,00,ss =
p2s (p
s
0)
2
p2v(p
v
0)
2 (Nclick,00,vv + δ
vv
00 )− δss00 + ∆ssvv00 , (44)
where the parameter δss00 denotes the deviation term between Eclick,00,ss and Nclick,00,ss and it can be
bounded by [−∆ss00, ∆̂ss00] except for a small error probability εss00 + ε̂ss00. The bounds are given by
∆ss00 = f(N, ε
ss
00) and ∆̂
ss
00 = f(N, ε̂
ss
00), and the parameter δ
vv
00 denotes the deviation term between
Eclick,00,vv andNclick,00,vv and it can be bounded by [−∆vv00 , ∆̂vv00 ] except for a small error probability
εvv00 + ε̂
vv
00 . The bounds are given by ∆
vv
00 = f(N, ε
vv
00) and ∆̂
vv
00 = f(N, ε̂
vv
00). In this way, given the
quantity NLclick,00,vv, we can estimate N
L
click,00,ss according to Eq. (44).
Note that, in general, one could alternatively first estimate all NLclick,00,kl for k, l ∈ {v,w, 0}
by using the linear programming method. Then by performing the trace distance argument, one
obtains ∣∣∣∣∣Eclick,00,ss −∑
k,l
q00,klEclick,00,kl
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Dss,∑ kl00 , (45)
with k, l ∈ {v,w, 0}, where q00,kl is the normalization probability given by q00,kl =
pkp
k
0plp
l
0∑
k′,l′∈{v,w,0}
pk′pk
′
0 pl′p
l′
0
and Dss,
∑
kl
00 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
D
ss,
∑
kl,i
00 :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Tr
[√
(
∑
k,l
q00,klρ
γkγl,i
00 − ργ
sγs,i
00 )
2
]
.
In so doing, and after applying Azuma’s inequality in Eq. (45), one can relate NLclick,00,ss to all
NLclick,00,kl for k, l ∈ {v,w, 0} in a similar way like Eq. (44). Finally, one can derive NLclick,00,ss
from the estimations of all the quantities NLclick,00,kl. However, our simulations suggest that the
improvement obtained when estimatingNLclick,00,ss with this general method is negligible compared
to the simpler method given by Eq. (44). Thus, in the following we use Eq. (44) to obtainNLclick,00,ss
from NLclick,00,vv.
Similarly, if we focus on the total number of events, N , and take n = m = 1, jA = jB = s
and kA = kB = v in Eqs. (6)-(8), we can estimate the quantity NLclick,11,ss by following the same
procedure explained above. We omit the explicit calculations here for simplicity.
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B. Estimation of the parameter eUph
To apply the idea of the quantum coin, we need to determine the form of the joint state prepared
by Alice and Bob together with Eve’s systems in a virtual scenario. To be precise, we shall consider
a virtual single-photon scenario, where we assume that Alice and Bob meet together and follow
the procedure introduced in [44]. That is, they prepare a joint state in each round of the protocol,
which has the form [44]:
|Ψ〉 ≡ pZ|0Z〉Aba |0Z〉Ac |ΨZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Aint,EIM,EPM|ΨZ〉Bq,Bp,Ba,Bint,EIM,EPM
+pX|0Z〉Aba|1Z〉Ac|ΨX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Aint,EIM,EPM |ΨX〉Bq,Bp,Ba,Bint,EIM,EPM
+
√
pZpX(|1Z〉Aba |0Z〉Ac |ΨZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Aint,EIM,EPM |ΨX〉Bq,Bp,Ba,Bint,EIM,EPM
+|1Z〉Aba|1Z〉Ac |ΨX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Aint,EIM,EPM |ΨZ〉Bq,Bp,Ba,Bint,EIM,EPM),
(46)
where the system Aba denotes a system in Alice’s hands which decides whether or not Alice’s and
Bob’s basis choices match by measuring it in the Z basis. The system Ac denotes Alice’s quantum
coin and this system determines her basis choice by measuring it in the Z basis. The system Aq
(Bq) denotes a virtual qubit, which contains Alice’s (Bob’s) bit value choice, the system Ap (Bp)
represents Alice’s (Bob’s) single-photon system that she (he) sends to the relay via the quantum
channel, the system Aa (Ba) denotes an ancilla system stored in Alice’s (Bob’s) lab to account
for the loss in the transmitter, and the system Aint (Bint) denotes a virtual system which decides
Alice’s (Bob’s) intensity setting choice. EIM and EPM, on the other hand, denote the systems
corresponding to the back-reflected light to Eve from the IM and the PM, respectively, together
with the systems EAa and E
B
a in Eve’s hands.
In this virtual protocol, the relay can perform any operation on each received signal pair from
Alice and Bob to decide in which rounds there will be ‘click’ events (i.e., successful measurement
results with the notation used in this paper). For each click event, the relay then performs some
measurement on the received signal pair and both Alice and Bob measure their systems Aq and
Bq in the X basis. Besides, Alice selects the ZAc or XAc basis with probabilities pZAc and pXAc ,
respectively, to measure her quantum coin in the selected basis.
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In general, we have that the states prepared by Alice for the Z and X bases are given by
|ΨZ〉Aq,Ap,Aint,EIM,EPM = 1√2
(
|0Z〉Aq |0Z〉Ap
∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθ0,Z〉
PM
+ |1Z〉Aq |1Z〉Ap
∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθ1,Z〉
PM
)
⊗ |Φγs〉Aint
∣∣∣ βs√
2
eiθs
〉
IM
|ΨX〉Aq,Ap,Aint,EIM,EPM = 1√2(pv+pw)
[|0X〉Aq |0X〉Ap(eiθ1√pv|Φγv〉Aint∣∣∣ βv√2eiθv〉IM
+ eiθ2
√
pw|Φγw〉Aint
∣∣∣ βw√
2
eiθw
〉
IM
)
∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθ0,X〉
PM
+ |1X〉Aq |1X〉Ap(eiθ3
√
pv|Φγv〉Aint
∣∣∣ βv√
2
eiθv
〉
IM
+ eiθ4
√
pw|Φγw〉Aint
∣∣∣ βw√
2
eiθw
〉
IM
)
∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθ1,X〉
PM
]
,
(47)
where |0Z〉Aq , |1Z〉Aq and |0X〉Aq , |1X〉Aq are the states of the virtual qubits which Alice measures
in the Z or X basis, respectively, to prepare a state with a particular bit value.
∣∣Φγk〉Aint is the
virtual state that determines the intensity setting choice k with k ∈ {s, v,w}. It holds that
〈Φγv |Φγw〉Aint = 0. This is so because in the X basis there are various intensity settings and
Alice knows which one she uses each given time. Note that, these states could also include
information leakage from the bit value choice as shown in Eq. (47). Since Alice always sends
a vacuum state when she selects the intensity setting γ0, there is no single-photon contribution
to the state |ΨX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,Aint,EIM,EPM from the intensity setting γ0. Likewise, Bob’s states
|ΨZ〉Bq,Bp,Ba,Bint,EIM,EPM and |ΨX〉Bq,Bp,Ba,Bint,EIM,EPM are defined in a similar way like Eq. (47)
by changing the subscript ‘A’ with ‘B’. In what follows, and in order to simplify the notation, we
omit the subscripts ‘Aq,Ap,Aa,Aint,EIM,EPM’ of the states prepared by Alice as well as those of
the states prepared by Bob; instead, we use the subscript ‘A,E’ for Alice and similarly for Bob.
Now we are ready to apply the quantum coin idea to this virtual scenario. By following the
same procedure applied to the virtual single-photon scenario explained in Sec. III B, we obtain a
similar expression like Eq. (37). In particular, we find that
pZAc
(
1− δsb,11,ss+vv|click
Nsb,11,ss+vv|click
) (
1− 2∆XAc=−
)
≤
√
(NX−error,11,vv|X +δX−error,11,vv|X )
Nclick,11,vv|X
(NX−error,11,ss|Z +δX−error,11,ss|Z )
Nclick,11,ss|Z
+
√(
1− NNo X−error,11,vv|X−δNo X−error,11,vv|X
Nclick,11,vv|X
)(
1− NNo X−error,11,ss|Z +δNo X−error,11,ss|Z
Nclick,11,ss|Z
)
,
(48)
where N11,ss+vv|click = Nclick,11,ss +Nclick,11,vv. The quantity NX−error,11,ss|Z is the actual number of
phase errors, which can be numerically estimated by using a similar method as that explained in
Sec. III B 2 and δX−error,11,ss|Z is the deviation term when using Azuma’s inequality to estimate it.
Note, however, that the value of ∆XAc=− is now different. To calculate ∆XAc=− we apply
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Eq. (32) to the states defined by Eq. (50). From Alice and Bob’s point of view, the bigger
Re
(
〈ΨZ |ΨX〉A,E 〈ΨZ |ΨX〉B,E
)
is, the better. Indeed, in the ideal scenario without information
leakage we have that Re
(
〈ΨZ |ΨX〉A,E 〈ΨZ |ΨX〉B,E
)
= 1. In general, Alice and Bob can choose
the states |Φγs〉, |Φγv〉 and |Φγw〉 such that 〈Φγv |Φγw〉 = 0 and the phases θ1, θ2, θ3 and θ4 in
order to maximize the quantity Re
(
〈ΨZ |ΨX〉A,E 〈ΨZ |ΨX〉B,E
)
. On the other hand, Eve can
choose the values of θs, θv, θw, θZ and θX to minimize Re
(
〈ΨZ |ΨX〉A,E 〈ΨZ |ΨX〉B,E
)
. To
maximize the quantity Re
(
〈ΨZ |ΨX〉A,E 〈ΨZ |ΨX〉B,E
)
, without loss of generality, we can choose
θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 and obtain that
Re
(
〈ΨZ |ΨX〉A,E 〈ΨZ |ΨX〉B,E
)
= exp
(
Imax
2
)
cos
(− Imax
2
) √pvRe(〈Φγs |Φγv〉〈βseiθs√2 ∣∣∣∣βveiθv√2 〉
IM
)
+
√
pwRe
(
〈Φγs |Φγw〉
〈
βse
iθs√
2
∣∣∣∣βweiθw√2
〉
IM
)
√
pv+pw
= exp
(
Imax
2
)
cos
(− Imax
2
) pvRe(〈βseiθs |βveiθv〉
IM
)+pwRe(〈βseiθs |βweiθw〉
IM
)
2(pv+pw)
,
(49)
where we have chosen 〈Φγs |Φγv〉 =
√
pv√
pv+pw
and 〈Φγs |Φγw〉 =
√
pw√
pv+pw
.
C. Simulation
The lower bound on the length of the secret key is given by Eq. (2). Let ΓAB and ΓE denote the
spaces of the parameters controlled by Alice and Bob, and by Eve, respectively. In the simulation,
we assume, without loss of generality, that θ0 = 0. Also, we assume that Eve’s back-reflected light
from the PM only depends on the basis information like we did in Sec. IV. In this case, we use the
following equation to replace Eq. (47) to calculate the quantity ∆XAc=− in the simulation:
|ΨZ〉Aq,Ap,Aint,EIM,EPM = 1√2
(
|0Z〉Aq |0Z〉Ap + |1Z〉Aq |1Z〉Ap
)
⊗ |Φγs〉Aint
∣∣∣βseiθs√
2
〉
IM
∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθZ〉
PM
,
|ΨX〉Aq,Ap,Aint,EIM,EPM = 1√2(pv+pw) ×
[|0X〉Aq |0X〉Ap(eiθ1√pv|Φγv〉Aint∣∣∣βveiθv√2 〉IM
+ eiθ2
√
pw|Φγw〉Aint
∣∣∣βweiθw√
2
〉
IM
)
+ |1X〉Aq |1X〉Ap(eiθ3
√
pv|Φγv〉Aint
∣∣∣βveiθv√
2
〉
IM
+ eiθ4
√
pw|Φγw〉Aint
∣∣∣βweiθw√
2
〉
IM
)
]∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθX〉
PM
.
(50)
The states described by Eq. (50) correspond to the case illustrated in Fig. 7.
Note that since the information leakage from the IM and the PM is correlated, in the following
figures, we plot the secret key rates in the presence of information leakage from both the IM and
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FIG. 8: Case 1. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of the total
number of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation where there is
no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. (b) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of information
leakage, Imax = 10−16. Different colored lines correspond to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. In
our simulations, for each value of the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs, γv and γw,
and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv and pw which are controlled by Alice and Bob, and we minimize it over the angles
θr, θZ and θX controlled by Eve, respectively.
the PM. Moreover, in this section, we compare the simulation results of this protocol with those
presented in Sec. IV when there is information leakage from both the IM and the PM.
1. Case 1
The simulation result of the secret key rate, `′/N , as a function of the transmission distance
between Alice and Bob in this case is shown in Fig. 8 (a) for a fixed value of the total number of
transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the key rate in the situation where
there is no information leakage, and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of
information leakage. The longest achievable distance without information leakage is about 96 km.
When Imax = 10−13, the secret key rate vanishes at about 52 km. In the simulation, we find that
in this case the optimized value of pZAc typically lies in the interval [0.75, 0.94]. That is, in this
protocol Alice and Bob can sacrifice a smaller proportion of the data than that in the symmetric
three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol (where, as we have shown in the previous section,
the typical interval of the optimized value of pZAc is [0.65, 0.9]).
36
Distance (km)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Ke
y 
ra
te
 ra
tio
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Imax=10-13,3-int
Imax=10-16,3-int
Imax=10-20,3-int
Imax=10-13,4-int
Imax=10-16,4-int
Imax=10-20,4-int
FIG. 9: The ratio (`′Imax>0/`
′
Imax=0
) between the secret key rates in logarithmic scale with and without information
leakage as a function of the distance for a fixed number, N = 1014, of transmitted pulses in the two protocols (3-
int and 4-int represent the three-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD protocol and the four-intensity decoy-state MDI
protocol that we consider, respectively). The solid (dotted) lines represent the 3-int protocol (the 4-int protocol).
Different colored lines correspond to different values of Imax.
Fig. 8 (b) shows the secret key rates as a function of the distance for a fixed value Imax = 10−16
for different total numbers of transmitted pulses. That is, this figure illustrates the effect of the
information leakage as a function of the number of transmitted pulses. For example, when Imax =
10−16, the longest achievable distance is about 84 km when the total number of transmitted pulses
is N = 1015. However, when N = 1012, this distance decreases to 21 km.
To further compare the effect of the information leakage on the secret key rate in the two
MDI-QKD protocols that we consider, we plot the the ratio (`′Imax>0/`
′
Imax=0
) between the secret
key rates for different positive values of information leakage, Imax, and the secret key rate when
there is no information leakage, i.e., Imax = 0, given a fixed total number of transmitted pulses,
say, N = 1014 in Fig. 9. The solid and dotted lines represent the ratios in the symmetric
three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and in the four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD
protocol, respectively. In the following, for simplicity, let us denote these two protocols by ‘3-
int’ and ‘4-int’, respectively. The result in Fig. 9 indicates that when the amount of information
leakage is small enough, for instance, Imax = 10−20, the impact of the information leakage on
the 3-int protocol is smaller than that on the 4-int protocol as the green solid line is always above
the green dotted line. However, the key rate ratio drops much faster as the amount of information
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leakage increases in the 3-int protocol than that in the 4-int protocol. From Fig. 9, we find that
when Imax = 10−16 and Imax = 10−13, the ratio in the 4-int protocol is bigger than that in the 3-int
protocol. That is, when Imax increases, the effect of information leakage becomes more relevant on
the 3-int protocol than that on the 4-int protocol given a fixed total number of transmitted pulses.
The intuition for this behaviour could be the following: From Figs. 2 and 7, we can see that the
back-reflected light from the PM is the same for the 3-int and 4-int protocol. Now suppose that
in the 4-int protocol Eve measures the back-reflected light from the IM and the PM independently
instead of splitting the back-reflected light with a 50:50 BS. Then she learns the same information
from the PM in both protocols. However, it may be more difficult for Eve to learn the information
from the IM in the 4-int protocol than in the 3-int protocol because she needs to distinguish
between four states in the former but she only needs to distinguish between three states in the
latter. In this case, the 4-int protocol is more robust against information leakage than the 3-int
protocol for all values of Imax. Nevertheless, if Eve exploits the correlations between the back-
reflected light from the IM and the PM, then which protocol is more robust seems to depend on
the value of Imax. In addition, note that the results illustrated in Fig. 9 consider the case where
Eve splits the back-reflected light with a 50:50 BS, which might not be the optimal option for the
example of THAs evaluated.
2. Case 2
The simulation result of the secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance between
Alice and Bob when N = 1014 and for different values of Imax is shown in Fig. 10 (a). Fig. 10 (b)
shows the secret key rate as a function of the distance for a fixed value of Imax = 10−16 and
different values of N . The behavior of the curves is very similar to those in case 1, and in the
simulation we find that the optimized value of pZAc is also similar. One main difference is that
with the same experimental parameters (see Table. III) the secret key rate is a little higher and the
achievable distance is a little longer than those in Case 1. For example, when the total number of
transmitted pulses is N = 1014 and Imax = 10−13, now we find that the secret key is positive up to
about 57 km while in Case 1 this distance is 52 km.
Here we omit the comparison of the key rate ratios between the two protocols as the result in
this case is similar to that shown in Fig. (9). And for the same reason, we omit such comparison
in Case 3 as well.
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FIG. 10: Case 2. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of the total
number of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation where there is
no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. (b) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of information
leakage, Imax = 10−16. Different colored lines correspond to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. In
our simulations, for each value of the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs, γv and γw,
and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv and pw which are controlled by Alice and Bob, and we minimize it over the angles
θr, θZ and θX controlled by Eve, respectively.
3. Case 3
The simulation result of the secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance between
Alice and Bob when N = 1014 and for different values of Imax is shown in Fig. 11 (a). Fig. 11 (b)
shows the finite-key effect on the secret key rate as a function of the distance for a fixed value
of Imax = 10−8 and for different values of N . Here, we find that the typical interval that
pZAc lies in is [0.86, 0.99]. Compared to the secret key rates shown in Figs 8 and 10, now it is
obviously improved. For example, when the total number of transmitted pulses is N = 1014 and
Imax = 10
−7, the secret key rate remains positive up to about 66 km. In comparison, the maximal
achievable distance with the same number of transmitted pulses and assuming an Imax as low as
10−13 is only about 57 km (52 km) in Case 2 (Case 1). As discussed previously, this is because the
phase randomization step removes the information leaked in the phase of the output states to Eve.
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FIG. 11: Case 3. (a) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of the total
number of transmitted pulses, N = 1014. The black solid line represents the perfectly isolated situation where there is
no information leakage (i.e., Imax = 0) and the different colored lines correspond to different amounts of information
leakage. (b) The secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance for a fixed value of information
leakage, Imax = 10−8. Different colored lines correspond to different values of the number of transmitted pulses. In
our simulations, for each value of the distance we maximize the secret key rate over the amplitudes γs, γv and γw,
and the probabilities pZAc , ps, pv and pw which are controlled by Alice and Bob.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have quantitatively analyzed the security of two decoy-state MDI-QKD
protocols with leaky sources in the finite-key regime. Specially, we have simulated the secret
key rate under three particular examples of THA, where Eve sends coherent pulses of light
to probe the intensity modulators and phase modulators of the legitimate parties. Similar to
the analysis presented in [25], we have introduced an additional post-processing step in the
actual protocol where Alice and Bob sacrifice part of their data. This step is necessary for the
security proof to go through. Our simulation results suggest that MDI-QKD is more sensitive to
information leakage than standard decoy-state QKD, but is possible to distill secure keys from
leaky sources within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that Alice’s and Bob’s
sources are sufficiently isolated. Furthermore, we have found that when the amount of information
leakage is small enough, the effect of information leakage has a bigger impact on the four-
intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol than on the symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-
QKD protocol. However, when the amount of information leakage increases, the four-intensity
MDI-QKD protocol becomes more robust against information leakage than the symmetric three-
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intensity MDI-QKD protocol.
In this context it would be interesting to consider a stronger THA, where Eve sends entangled
probe states to Alice’s and Bob’s sources instead of sending them independent bright pulses. In
this scenario, by performing a joint measurement on the outgoing states as well as on her ancilla
system, Eve might be able to extract more information about Alice’s and Bob’s internal settings
than what has been presented in this paper. This scenario, however, is beyond the scope of this
work but could be evaluated with the techniques that have been introduced in this paper.
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VII. APPENDIXES
A. Trace distance parameters
1. Three-intensity MDI-QKD protocol
For simplicity, we assume that there is no quantum correlation between Alice’s (Bob’s) and
Eve’s systems [25]. As a result, the parameter DjAjB,ssZ,nm does not depend on the basis Z nor on
the photon number n,m. Therefore, we shall denote it by DjAjB,ss. Below we show the values of
DjAjB,ss for the three different cases considered in the simulation. The detailed calculations are
similar to those in [24].
Case 1
In this case, DjAjB,ss is given by
DjAjB,ss =
√
1− ∣∣〈βjAeiθjA |βseiθs 〉× 〈βjBeiθjB |βseiθs 〉∣∣2
=
√
1− exp {2Imax [cos (θs − θjA) + cos (θs − θjB)− 2]}.
(51)
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Case 2
In this case, we have that
DjAjB,ss =
√
1− ∣∣〈βjAeiθjA |βseiθs 〉× 〈βjBeiθjB |βseiθs 〉∣∣2
= {
√
1− exp
{
Imax
γs
[
2
√
γsγjA cos (θs − θjA) + 2
√
γsγjB cos (θs − θjB)− γjA − γjB
]}
.
(52)
Case 3
In this last case, we further assume that the following constraints hold: Imax ≤ log2 and
γw ≤ γv ≤ γs for any Pcut ≥ 1. According to the definition of the states given by Eq. (41), it turns
out that DjAjB,ss is given by
DjAjB,ss =
√
1− ∣∣〈βjAeiθjA |βseiθs 〉× 〈βjBeiθjB |βseiθs 〉∣∣2
= 1
2
∞∑
n,m=0
∣∣∣∣ {exp (−β2jA) (βjA)2nn! − exp (−β2s ) (βs)2nn! }{
exp
(−β2jB) (βjB)2mm! − exp (−β2s ) (βs)2mm! } ∣∣∣∣
= exp(−Imax)
2
∞∑
n,m=0
(Imax)
n+m
n!m!
∣∣∣∣ {1− exp [Imax (1− γjA/γs)] (γjA)n(γs)n }
×
{
1− exp [Imax (1− γjB/γs)] (γ
jB)
m
(γs)m
} ∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
− exp(−Imax)
2
Pcut∑
n,m=0
(Imax)
n+m
n!m!
[
1−
∣∣∣∣1− exp [Imax (1− γjAγs )] (γjA)n(γs)n ∣∣∣∣]
×
[
1−
∣∣∣∣1− exp [Imax (1− γjBγs )] (γjB)m(γs)m ∣∣∣∣] ,
(53)
for any Pcut ≥ 0.
2. Four-intensity MDI-QKD protocol
In this section, we present the trace distance parameters for the four-intensity MDI-QKD
protocol. We make the same assumptions as those in the previous section. The only difference
comes from the fact that now the back-reflected light from the PM also contributes to the trace
distance parameters. In particular, we obtain the following results in the three cases.
Case 1
In this case, DjAjB,ss is given by
DjAjB,ss =
√
1−
∣∣∣∣〈βjAeiθjA√2 ∣∣∣βseiθs√2 〉〈βjBeiθjB√2 ∣∣∣βseiθs√2 〉(〈√ Imax2 eiθX ∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθZ〉)2
∣∣∣∣2
=
√
1− exp{1
8
Imax [cos (θs − θjA) + cos (θs − θjB) + 2 cos (θZ − θX)− 4]
}
.
(54)
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Case 2
In this case, we have that
DjAjB,ss =
√
1−
∣∣∣∣〈βjAeiθjA√2 ∣∣∣βseiθs√2 〉〈βjBeiθjB√2 ∣∣∣βseiθs√2 〉(〈√ Imax2 eiθX ∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθZ〉)2
∣∣∣∣2
=
√
1− exp
{
Imax
8γs
Θ(γs, γjA , γjB , θZ, θX)
}
,
(55)
where
Θ(γs, γjA , γjB , θZ, θX) =√
γsγjA cos (θs − θjA) +
√
γsγjB cos (θs − θjB) + 2γs cos (θZ − θX)− γjA − γjB − 2.
(56)
Case 3
In this last case, we further assume that the following constraints hold: Imax ≤ log2 and
0 < γw ≤ γv ≤ γs for any Pcut ≥ 1. According to the definition of the states given by Eq. (41), it
turns out that DjAjB,ss is given by
DjAjB,ss =
√
1−
∣∣∣∣〈βjAeiθjA√2 ∣∣∣βseiθs√2 〉〈βjBeiθjB√2 ∣∣∣βseiθs√2 〉(〈√ Imax2 eiθX ∣∣∣√ Imax2 eiθZ 〉)2
∣∣∣∣2
= 1
2
∞∑
n,m=0
∣∣∣∣ {exp [−12 (β2jA + Imax)] (β2jA+Imax)nn! − exp (−β2s ) (βs)2nn! }{
exp
[−1
2
(
β2jB + Imax
)] (β2jB+Imax)m
m!
− exp (−β2s ) (βs)
2m
m!
} ∣∣∣∣
= exp(−Imax/2)
2
∞∑
n,m=0
(Imax)
n+m
n!m!
∣∣∣∣ {1− exp [Imax (1− γjA+γs2γs )] (γjA+γs)n(2γs)n }
×
{
1− exp
[
Imax
(
1− γjB+γs
2γs
)]
(γjB+γs)
m
(2γs)m
} ∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
− exp(−Imax/2)
2
Pcut∑
n,m=0
(Imax)
n+m
n!m!
[
1−
∣∣∣∣1− exp [Imax (1− γjA+γs2γs )] (γjA+γs)n(2γs)n ∣∣∣∣]
×
[
1−
∣∣∣∣1− exp [Imax (1− γjB+γs2γs )] (γjB+γs)m(2γs)m ∣∣∣∣] ,
(57)
for any Pcut ≥ 0.
B. Calculation of the probability Prj (XAc = − |XAc , sb)
According to Eq. (23) in Sec. III B 1 of the main text, if we consider the basis matched case,
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the normalized state has the form:
|Ψj〉 =
(
pZ√
p2Z+p
2
X
|0Z〉Ac
∣∣ΨjZ〉A,E∣∣ΨjZ〉B,E + pX√p2Z+p2X |1Z〉Ac∣∣ΨjX〉A,E∣∣ΨjX〉B,E
)
|0Z〉Aba
=
(
pZ√
p2Z+p
2
X
|+〉Ac+|−〉Ac√
2
∣∣ΨjZ〉A,E∣∣ΨjZ〉B,E + pX√p2Z+p2X |+〉Ac−|−〉Ac√2 |1Z〉Ac∣∣ΨjX〉A,E∣∣ΨjX〉B,E
)
|0Z〉Aba
=
[
pZ√
2(p2Z+p2X)
∣∣ΨjZ〉A,E∣∣ΨjZ〉B,E + pX√2(p2Z+p2X) ∣∣ΨjX〉A,E∣∣ΨjX〉B,E
]
|+〉Ac |0Z〉Aba
+
[
pZ√
2(p2Z+p2X)
∣∣ΨjZ〉A,E∣∣ΨjZ〉B,E − pX√2(p2Z+p2X) ∣∣ΨjX〉A,E∣∣ΨjX〉B,E
]
|−〉Ac|0Z〉Aba ,
(58)
where |+〉Ac and |−〉Ac are the two eigenstates of the quantum coin in the XAc basis with |+〉Ac =
|0Z〉Ac+|1Z〉Ac√
2
and |−〉Ac =
|0Z〉Ac−|1Z〉Ac√
2
.
In each round, the conditional probability Prj (XAc = − |XAc , sb) is given by
Prj (XAc = − |XAc , sb)
= [ (pZ)
2
2(p2Z+p2X)
〈ΨjZ|ΨjZ
〉
A,E
〈ΨjZ|ΨjZ
〉
B,E
+ (pX)
2
2(p2Z+p2X)
〈ΨjX|ΨjX
〉
A,E
〈ΨjX|ΨjX
〉
B,E
− 2pZpX
(p2Z+p2X)
Re
(
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
A,E
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
B,E
)
]
= 1
2
[
1− 2pZpX
p2Z+p
2
X
Re
(
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
A,E
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
B,E
)]
.
(59)
Then we have that
max
j∈{1,2,...N}
Prj (XAc = − |XAc , sb) =
1
2
{
1− 2pZpX
p2Z + p
2
X
min
j∈{1,2,...N}
Re
(
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
A,E
〈ΨjZ|ΨjX
〉
B,E
)}
.
(60)
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